The key issue in this case is whether the definition of "aggravated felony" in the federal
immigration laws, which includes the definition of a "crime of violence," is unconstitutionally vague.
The parties are Attorney General Jeff Sessions, and James Garcia Dimaya, who's an immigrant
to this country from the Philippines.
He had been convicted twice of residential burglary.
Those are aggravated felonies under the legal definition in federal law.
A provision of the immigration law, section 16B, requires mandatory removal of illegal
aliens who are convicted of crimes of violence.
Title 18 of the United States Code defines "crime of violence" as any offense that is a
felony, that by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force against a person
or property may be used in the commission of the crime.
We've got this doctrine in federal constitutional law about vagueness that if a statute, particularly
a criminal statute, is so unclear that people of reasonable intelligence don't know what
it means, they don't know what conduct is prohibited by it, and therefore what conduct
constitutes a crime, then we call that "unconstitutionally vague."
There's a big issue in this case whether that doctrine even really applies in the context
of an immigration removal proceeding.
When you're putting somebody in prison, you want to make clear in the language of the
statute that they knew they were violating the law.
Much less concern about that when you're talking about deportation.
One of the key issues in this case is the language in the immigration statute, is to
be treated differently than the similar language in the federal criminal statute.
Deportation proceedings are not a criminal matter.
They're a civil proceeding and we don't have the same heightened protections, the rules
of lenity, uh, leniency if you will, that we have in the criminal context.
There was a case decided by the Supreme Court a few years ago called Johnson versus United
States that dealt with language in a federal criminal statute, the Armed Career Criminal
Act.
Mr. Dimaya's strongest argument is gonna be rooted in the Supreme Court's decision
in the United States versus Johnson, the Armed Career Criminal Act, used very similar language
to define "crime of violence" and the court held that that was unconstitutionally vague.
The Court rules for Mr. Dimaya, there will be a number of implications in the immigration
field.
There are a number of provisions in the immigration law that allow illegal immigrants to seek
asylum or to seek voluntary departure.
And someone convicted of a crime of violence under this s-statute is ineligible for that
preferential treatment under all of those provisions.
Our racketeering and money laundering statutes, our domestic violence statutes, our child
abuse statutes, all have used similar language that might well be affected if the Supreme
Court here holds that this definition of a "crime of violence" is unconstitutionally vague.
If the Court rules in favor of the government, I think we will see the status quo, uh, preserved,
t-the Executive Branch the immigration forces have been relying on section 16B for nearly
30 years.
So what's the strongest argument in defense of the government?
Well, the statute is clear enough for immigration purposes even if similar language in a criminal
statute is not clear enough for purposes of the criminal law.
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